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CORPORATE FINANCE, CORPORATE
LAW AND FINANCE THEORY
PETER H. HUANG* & MICHAEL S. KNOLL†

Twenty-five years ago, only a few U.S. law schools offered a course
in corporate finance, and those that did offered a specialized, practical
course. Today, most U.S. law schools offer a theoretical corporate finance
course. The shift from a highly specialized elective to a mainstay of the
curriculum and from nuts and bolts to principles underscores the legal
profession’s recognition that finance theory is critical for understanding
corporate law issues.1
The typical contemporary law school corporate finance class consists
of two parts. The first part focuses on valuation (the finance part of
corporate finance);2 the second part usually covers capital structure (the
corporate part of corporate finance). The distinction is sometimes
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor of
Law and Olin Fellow, University of Southern California Law School.
† Professor of Law and Real Estate, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton
School; member of the University of Southern California Law School faculty, 1990–2000.
© 2000 Peter H. Huang and Michael S. Knoll, all rights reserved. Do not cite or quote without
the authors’ permission. We acknowledge a great debt to our colleagues at USC and Penn, two schools
each with a strong history of interdisciplinary scholarship and together with a tradition of academic
collaboration, for their years of intellectual encouragement and academic support. Thanks to Frank
Partnoy for helpful comments. Thanks also to Bill Draper, bibliographic wonder and faculty liaison at
Penn’s Biddle Library. Finally, thanks to Anita Famili and Princeton Kim, USC Law School Class of
2001, for excellent research assistance.
1. Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black chose 1972, the year Victor Brudney and Marvin
Chirelstein published the first edition of their casebook, Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance, to
mark the beginning of the legal profession’s recognition that corporate lawyers should have a grounding
in finance theory. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT 1 (1993).
2. Finance has been described as the economics of time and risk. See Stephen A. Ross,
Finance, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 322, 326–29 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1987); Lawrence Summers, On Economics and Finance, 40 J. FIN. 633, 634 (1985) (providing an
amusing account of the relationship between economics and finance).
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described as one between the left-hand and right-hand sides of the
corporate balance sheet. Thus, valuation focuses on what assets the firm
should hold and capital structure on how it should finance those assets.
The central and unifying theme behind the first part of the course—
valuation—is the net present value (NPV) rule. NPV is the discounted
present value of the cash flow from a given project. The NPV rule states
that among independent projects the investor should accept all positive
NPV projects and reject all negative ones; among mutually exclusive
projects, the investor should choose the project with the highest (positive)
NPV.3 Although understanding how to use the NPV rule is not the same as
being able to figure out what investments to make, the rule provides a
framework to decide whether to accept or reject any given project.4
A comprehensive corporate finance course describes the NPV rule,
underscores the assumptions upon which it is based,5 illustrates alternative
rules and shows how these alternatives can lead investors astray,6 and
makes clear the demanding informational requirements of the rule.7 Most
law school corporate finance teachers also call upon their students to apply
what they have learned, drawing applications from court cases and other
legal settings.8
In contrast with the first part of the course, where most professors
cover roughly the same material, there is wide variance in coverage in the
second part. The topics covered often include at least some of the
3. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 24 (6th
ed. 2000); STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE
57–60, 189 (5th ed. 1999).
4. The NPV rule provides the correct answer because undertaking a positive-NPV project
increases consumption possibilities and undertaking a negative NPV reduces them. ROSS ET AL., supra
note 3, at 50–57.
5. The most crucial assumption is that borrowing and lending rates are equal.
6. The most popular alternative rules are the payback, average accounting return and internal
rate of return rules.
7. Following the standard business school corporate finance texts, these materials are taught
first under the assumption that the cash flows are certain (the so-called “risk free world”). The
discussion then turns to modern portfolio theory, which relates risk to expected return. The first part
usually concludes with a discussion of market efficiency and possibly option theory. See GILSON &
BLACK, supra note 1, at 231–51; Peter H. Huang, Teaching Corporate Law from an Options
Perspective, 34 U. GA. L. REV. 571, 575–92 (2000) (describing how corporate law can be taught from
an options perspective); Merton H. Miller & Keith Sharfman, The Economic Expert Witness, 3 GREEN
BAG 2d 297, 307 (2000) (discussing the ubiquitous nature of options in legal decisionmaking).
8. The preference for legal materials serves several goals. First, it shows students that finance
questions arise in many legal contexts and that a basic understanding of finance is important to many
lawyers, not just business lawyers. Second, it drives home the point that there is a large variance in
financial sophistication within the bar and on the bench and, thus, the potential for a high return on their
investment in studying.

2000]

CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCE THEORY

177

following: debt, equity and other securities (such as preferred stock,
convertible bonds, and warrants), dividends, conflicts between investors
(and perhaps other stakeholders as well), the use of securities other than
debt and equity, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy, utility rate
regulation, derivatives, leasing, and financial innovation.
Given the wide divergence in choice of topics, it is perhaps not
surprising that many corporate finance professors teach these materials as a
collection of loosely related topics. In this essay, we describe a theme that
we have used for several years to tie these materials together. The theme
we propose should be useful regardless of the topics. It will also help legal
scholars who seek to understand business developments, how businesses
react to laws, and how they should be regulated. In addition, lawyers who
understand and apply the theme will be better able to advise their clients.
I. THE MODIGLIANI-MILLER THEOREM OF CAPITAL
STRUCTURE IRRELEVANCY (THE M&M THEOREM)
First published more than forty years ago,9 the M&M Theorem has
been called the foundation of modern finance.10 The M&M Theorem states
that under certain idealized assumptions the cost of capital to the firm and
the total value of the firm are independent of the firm’s capital structure.11
Succinctly (if somewhat colloquially) stated, corporate capital structure is
irrelevant. The assumptions upon which the M&M Theorem rest can be
categorized as follows:12
(1) No income taxes: There are no income taxes in the economy,
either at the firm level or the individual level.
(2) Equal borrowing cost: Individuals can borrow at the same interest
rate as corporations.
9. Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the
Theory of Investment, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 655 (1959).
10. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 390; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Why Financial Structure Matters, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 121, 121; Unlocking Corporate Finance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, at 81.
Modigliani and Miller’s method of proof—arbitrage will ensure that financial substitutes will sell for
the same price—is the foundation for many central ideas in finance including both the capital asset
pricing model and the Black-Scholes formula for option prices. Stephen A. Ross, Comment on the
Modigliani-Miller Propositions, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 127, 128–29; Hal Varian, The Arbitrage
Principle in Financial Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1997, at 55, 56.
11. The value of the firm is the present value of the corporation’s cash flow discounted at the
firm’s cost of capital. Thus, maximizing the value of the firm is equivalent to minimizing the cost of
capital.
12. See, e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 404 (1998).
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(3) Efficient market hypothesis: Information regarding securities,
corporations, and markets is freely available and commonly understood by
all market participants. This implies that insiders do not have better
information than other investors and that all investors share homogeneous
expectations about the future prices of securities.
(4) Perfect markets: There are no bankruptcy, transaction, contracting,
or agency costs. This assumption implies that the firm’s investment policy
is fixed and its cash flows are given.
The M&M Theorem is often described as the principle of the
conservation of value.13 The idea is that regardless of how the interests in a
business enterprise are divided, the total value of the enterprise is
unchanged.14 The Theorem therefore also implies that the chief financial
officer (CFO) who frets over the corporation’s balance sheet and the
financial economist who studies the CFO’s decisions are both wasting their
time.
When it first appeared, commentators vigorously debated the
Theorem’s significance.15 The debate was not whether the theorem was a
completely accurate picture of reality (after all, even its staunchest
defenders acknowledged that our economy had taxes), but whether it
captured the essential features well enough so that its conclusion was
roughly correct. Over time, the consensus has developed that the theorem
does not accurately capture reality and so its conclusion is incorrect.16
Surprisingly, it is precisely the inaccuracy of the M&M Theorem’s
assumptions that makes it the foundation of modern corporate finance.
13. Modigliani and Miller prove their theorem by demonstrating that given their four
assumptions any corporate capital structure (debt-equity ratio) can be costlessly replicated by investors.
See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 9, at 268. Thus, no investor would pay a premium for any capital
structure because he can produce that same structure himself at no cost on his own account by
increasing or decreasing leverage through borrowing or lending.
14. See ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 379 (providing an account of Professor Miller’s difficulty
in explaining the M&M Theorem to reporters when Professor Modigliani won the Noble Prize in
economics; he finally succeeded when he used the analogy that a pizza is no larger if you cut it into
more slices).
15. Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 1998, at 99, 99–100.
16. See Ross, supra note 2, at 332, 335; Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Theory of Corporate
Finance: A Historical Overview, in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 3, 4 (Clifford W.
Smith ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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II. THE REVERSE M&M THEOREM
The explanatory power of the M&M Theorem comes from turning it
upside down: If capital structure can affect the value of the firm, it must
work through one or more of the four M&M assumptions.17 That is to say,
the only ways that capital structure can increase value are by lowering
taxes, providing access to cheaper borrowing, releasing valuable
information, or improving cash flow. We call this idea the Reverse M&M
Theorem.
The crucial insight provided by the M&M Theorem is that it tells us
where to look to understand capital structure.18 If we want to understand
how firms raise capital, we need to look at taxes, borrowing costs,
information, and cash flows. Any explanation why some firms tend to use
or avoid particular capital structures must, therefore, focus on exploiting
the failures to satisfy the M&M assumptions. In this way, the Reverse
M&M Theorem is an important organizing principle for modern corporate
finance because it tells us what types of arguments can explain capital
structure policies.19 At a very general level, the most commonly invoked
explanations for capital structures are as follows:
Taxes: Relaxing the assumption of no taxes implies that capital
structure can create value by reducing taxes. This opens the way for
explanations based on tax asymmetries.20
17. Logically, the theorem can be written in the form “if p, then q.” In this form, p is the four
assumptions and q is the conclusion that capital structure is irrelevant. The validity of the theorem as a
form of economic reasoning, in the sense that if the assumptions are true the conclusion follows, is
generally accepted. As a matter of logic, if a statement is true, so is the contrapositive. The
contrapositive of the statement “if p, then q” is the statement “if not q, then not p.” The contrapositive
of the M&M Theorem is that if capital structure matters, then the four assumptions do not all hold.
Economic intuition adds content to that logic by recognizing that any explanation must work through at
least one of the assumptions.
18. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 395; Smith, supra note 16.
19. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 395; James A. Brickley & John J. McConnell, Dividend Policy,
in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 896; Claire Hill,
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1084–1106 (1996);
Michael Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation
and Risk Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1467 n.24 (1993); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives,
Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1039, 1058–78; Ross, supra note 2, at 322; Smith, supra note 16; Clifford Smith, Charles
Smithson & D. Sykes Wilford, Financial Engineering: Why Hedge?, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING 126, 128 (Clifford Smith & Charles Smithson eds., 1990).
20. See, e.g., Harry D. DeAngelo & Ronald Masulis, Optimal Capital Structure Under
Corporate and Personal Taxation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 44 (1980).
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Inefficient markets:21 Relaxing the efficiency assumption implies that
individuals can have different information and different opinions as to how
much a security is worth. This has led to explanations based upon
signaling22 and heterogeneous expectations.23
Imperfect markets:24 Relaxing the assumption of perfect capital
markets means that capital structure can create value by changing
investment policy. This has led to explanations based on agency costs.25
III. APPLICATIONS
Capital structure is more than simply the firm’s selection of its debtto-equity ratio. Generally speaking, it is the decision of how to raise the
funds to pay for the corporation’s assets. It addresses the following
questions: What securities should the firm issue? How much of each
security should the firm issue? To whom should such securities be issued?
And what rights should different classes of securityholders have? The rest
of this section will describe several important capital structure
21. Modigliani and Miller implicitly assume that investors are rational. A large amount of recent
research is in the field of behavioral finance, which assumes that investors are systematically irrational.
See generally MAX BAZERMAN, SMART MONEY DECISIONS: WHY YOU DO WHAT YOU DO WITH
MONEY (AND HOW TO CHANGE IT FOR THE BETTER) (1999); GARY BELSKY & TOM GILOVICH, WHY
SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW
SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (1999); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR:
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000). Thus,
behavioral finance has implications for corporate finance. SHEFRIN, supra, 225–70; ANDREI SHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 184–85 (2000).
22. E.g., Peter H. Huang, Structural Stability of Financial and Accounting Signaling Equilibria,
9 RES. FIN. 37 (1991) (demonstrating the robustness of financial and accounting signaling models);
Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, 8 BELL
J. ECON & MGMT. SCI. 23 (1977).
23. E.g., ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT MARKETS
120–38 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that many long-accepted principles of corporate finance require revision
because corporations face inefficient, over-reactive capital markets); SHEFRIN, supra note 21, at 227–37
(discussing cognitive biases in takeovers); Lynn Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) (arguing that takeover
premiums do not measure the gains created by mergers because inframarginal investors value the
target’s securities above their market price).
24. The assumption that individuals can borrow at the same rate as corporations is not as
unrealistic as it might first seem because of the possibility of borrowing on margin. See WILLIAM A.
KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 343–44 (7th ed. 2000). In any event, the relaxation of this assumption has not generated
much literature.
25. E.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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developments and offer explanations for those structures using the Reverse
M&M Theorem.26
A. CONVERTIBLE BONDS
In addition to debt and equity, many firms also issue convertible
bonds. A convertible bond is a bond that is convertible at the option of the
holder into another security, usually the issuer’s equity.27 A convertible
bond is a hybrid security, combining elements of both debt and equity.28
Because the issuer, by combining elements of both securities, discourages
the clienteles for each security from buying its hybrid, some commentators
have wondered why firms issue convertible bonds.29
A frequently offered explanation begins with the observation that
convertible bonds pay interest at a lower rate than otherwise comparable
straight bonds. That observation has led some observers and market
participants to argue that convertible bonds are cheaper than straight bonds
by the difference in interest rates.30 That explanation, however, ignores the
cost to the firm of the option to convert: Because the expected value of the
conversion privilege to the holder is also the cost to the firm’s
equityholders of having sold that right, the value of the option should equal
the interest saved.31
The Reverse M&M Theorem suggests several more persuasive
reasons for using convertible bonds. Convertible bonds help to control
agency problems, especially the tendency for highly leveraged firms to
pursue high-variability projects with a negative NPV because the
equityholders enjoy the entire upside of their decisions, but their downside
is truncated by limited liability.32 Convertible debt can counter this
tendency because the conversion privilege gives the debtholders the ability
26. Our list is incomplete; we could have included additional topics and additional explanations
for the topics included if we had the space.
27. For example, Compaq might issue for $1000 a convertible bond that can be converted into
twenty shares of common stock. The conversion ratio is then said to be 20 and the implied conversion
price $50 a share.
28. It pays interest and has priority in bankruptcy, both debt characteristics, but it participates in
the issuer’s upside, an equity characteristic. William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar
Package, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 553 (1975).
29. E.g., id. at 555–60.
30. See William M. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 667, 673 n.20 (citing surveys of convertible bond issuers).
31. Klein, supra note 28, at 555–60 (describing the cheaper financing rationale for convertible
bonds).
32. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25, at 334–37. In the finance literature, this phenomenon is
called asset substitution.
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to capture some of the upside by converting. Under certain circumstances,
this will reduce the benefit to the equityholders by enough to prevent them
from pursuing a bad project.33
Another reason for issuing convertible bonds is to mitigate problems
caused by asymmetric information. For a firm with a given expected value,
the equity will be worth more and the debt will be worth less the more
volatile the firm’s value.34 If outside investors cannot accurately evaluate
the firm’s risk and if they believe that the firm’s insiders can more
accurately assess that risk, they will discount whatever security the firm
offers. If the firm sells debt, they will assume the firm is risky.
Alternatively, if the firm sells equity, they will assume the firm has little
risk.35 For such opaque firms, the possibility of offering a security with
both debt and equity characteristics allows the firm to offer a “vertical
slice” of the company.36 This slice is more cost-effective because any
discount is smaller since there is less opportunity for the insiders to exploit
their informational advantage.37
B. PROJECT FINANCE
In a project financing, the sponsoring entity sets up a project as a
distinct legal entity and raises funds through the project, which issues
securities.38 The investors, thus, look to the project’s cash flow for their
return. Many large and high-profile projects have been built using project
33. AMIR BARNEA, ROBERT A. HAUGEN & LEMMA W. SENBET, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND
FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 80–105 (1985); ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 614–15; Kjell Nyborg,
Rationale for Convertible Bonds, in THE COMPLETE FINANCE COMPANION 241, 244–45 (Tim Dickson
& George Bickerstaffe eds., 1998).
34. Equity represents a call on the firm’s assets at the face amount of the debt, and debt
represents ownership of the firm’s assets subject to equity’s call. Because the value of the call option is
an increasing function of the volatility of the underlying asset, the equity will be worth more and the
debt will be worth less the more volatile is the firm’s value. BARNEA ET AL., supra note 33, at 80–105;
ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 614–15.
35. Thus, the insider’s superior information actually financially disadvantages the insiders.
Because outside investors know that they are at a disadvantage, they will assume the worst and pay less
for whichever security—debt or equity—the firm issues.
36. This assumes that the firm already has debt outstanding and thus cannot issue equity that
offers a vertical slice of the company.
37. Michael Brennan & Eduardo Schwartz, The Case for Convertibles, CHASE FIN. Q., Spring
1982, at 27, 28, reprinted in J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1998, at 55, 56.
38. The use of a separate legal entity removes the assets from the originator’s estate in the event
the originator goes bankrupt.
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finance, including the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the English Channel
Tunnel.39
Project financing is a capital structure decision because the firm could
fund the project using its own credit. A common explanation for project
finance is that firms with weak credit ratings can finance a project more
cheaply with project finance than on their own account. That explanation,
however, is wrong because it violates the Reverse M&M Theorem: It
assumes that capital structure can create value without implicating any of
the M&M assumptions.40
There are, however, several more plausible explanations. Project
finance can overcome the underinvestment problem—the possibility that
the firm will not invest in positive-NPV projects that require an outside
contribution of capital because a portion of the capital investment might go
to pay the claims of existing debtholders.41 Because the project is funded
as a separate entity, none of the project’s cash flow can be siphoned off to
pay the firm’s general creditors. Thus, any positive-NPV project can be
funded with project finance.42
Project finance can also discipline management. Unlike corporations
that have an indefinite life, most projects have a finite life. Thus, if the
investors are to be repaid and earn a profit, they must receive these
amounts over the project’s life. Accordingly, most project financings call
for the periodic payment to the equityholders of all cash flows above those
necessary to pay the project’s creditors and to continue maintaining the
project’s assets. In contrast, if the project were financed internally, the
management would only have to pay the debtholders. The rest of the cash
flow generated by the project (the project’s free cash flow) would be in the
39. For a history of project finance, see Harold Rose, Building on the Benefits of Project
Financing, in THE COMPLETE FINANCE COMPANION, supra note 33, at 80, 80–85. Very similar to
project financing is securitization. The difference between a project financing and a securitization is the
assets held by the separate legal entity backing the securities. In a project financing, the entity holds
real assets, such as a power plant, factory or mine; in a securitization, the entity holds receivables, such
as home mortgages, automobile loans, or credit card receipts. Beginning with mortgage-backed
securities in 1975, securitizations have grown rapidly, reaching $2.5 trillion in 1996. Harold Rose,
Securitization: Unbundling for Value, in THE COMPLETE FINANCE COMPANION, supra note 33, at 252,
256.
40. Cf. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 372–74 (debt is not cheaper than equity even though debt
pays a lower return because issuing debt increases the equity’s risk and thus its expected return).
41. Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977)
(describing the underinvestment problem).
42. See Teresa A. John & Kose John, Optimality of Project Financing: Theory and Empirical
Implications in Finance and Accounting, 1 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 51 (1991) (describing
how project finance can be used to overcome the underinvestment problem).
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control of the managers. Such free cash flow can be a source of agency
costs within the firm, because the managers might invest that cash in
negative-NPV projects.43 Project finance, by forcing the managers to pay
the otherwise free cash flow to outside investors, allows the investors, not
the managers, to decide where the free cash flow will be invested.44 If the
managers want to make new investments, they must raise the capital from
outside investors.
Project finance can also create value when there are informational
asymmetries. A firm’s managers often have more information about a
business than do outside investors. Keeping nonpublic information from
competitors can be very valuable. On the other hand, keeping information
from investors is costly because investors, suspicious that the secrecy
conceals bad news, will discount the issuer’s securities.45 Project
financings can reduce, in two ways, these discounts without revealing
sensitive information to competitors. First, if it is difficult to ascertain the
project’s value without this information, the firm can use project finance
and disclose the information only to those who finance the project.46
Second, even if the project itself is transparent, the firm might have other
projects that rely on sensitive information. The latter projects are good
candidates for internal financing. Project finance is an attractive means of
raising outside capital for transparent projects, so internal funding can be
used for opaque ones.47
C. FINANCIAL ENGINEERING WITH DERIVATIVES
A derivative is a security the value of which is derived from another
security.48 Thus, call options,49 put options,50 and forward contracts51 are
43. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (describing the agency costs of free cash flow).
44. JOHN D. FINNERTY, PROJECT FINANCING: ASSET-BASED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 20 (1996)
(describing how project finance can reduce the agency costs of free cash flow).
45. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) (providing an
asymmetric information-based justification for a pecking order theory of capital structure).
46. For example, the funds for a mining operation can be raised this way without publicly
disclosing the find and tipping off competitors and land owners. Salmon Shah & Anjan V. Thakor,
Optimal Capital Structure and Project Financing, 42 J. ECON. THEORY 209 (1987).
47. FINNERTY, supra note 44, at 21–22, 352; (discussing Andrew H. Chen, John W. Kensinger &
John D. Martin, Project Financing as a Means of Preserving Financial Flexibility (1989) (unpublished
working paper)).
48. Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 471, 483 (2000).
49. The holder of a call option has the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the underlying
asset at the strike price before the option expires.
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all derivatives because the value of these securities all depend upon the
price of the underlying securities upon which they are based.52
Nonfinancial corporations use derivatives to control risk, such as the risk
that the price of a raw material will rise or that exchange rates will move
against them.53 This practice is called financial engineering54 or hedging.55
And it has exploded,56 from a nearly standing start in the early 1970s to
over $100 trillion at the end of 1999 (as measured by their notional value or
principal amount).57
One of the major lessons of modern portfolio theory is that risk-averse
investors should diversify in order to eliminate their exposure to unique
risk.58 Although firms could manage their risk directly by using
derivatives, corporations can avoid the attendant effort and expense by
allowing the unique risk to flow through to shareholders. Because
individuals can diversify, corporations should not use derivatives simply to
reduce the unique risk they pass through to shareholders.59 Accordingly, if
corporations can create value for their investors with financial engineering,
that value must come from somewhere other than a reduction in unique
risk. The Reverse M&M Theorem suggests at least two possible sources of
that value.
First, hedging can create value for shareholders by reducing taxes.
Although the corporate tax structure is fairly flat,60 there is an important
50. The holder of a put option has the right, but not the obligation, to sell the underlying asset at
the strike price before the option expires.
51. The holder of a forward contract is obligated to purchase the underlying asset at the strike
price when the contract matures.
52. For example, the value of a call option on 100 shares of Microsoft with a strike price of $100
that expires on February 1, 2001 is a function of the price of the common stock of Microsoft on or
before that date. In general, the higher the price of the underlying asset goes, the greater the value of a
call option on that asset.
53. DONALD R. CHAMBERS & NELSON J. LACEY, MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 576 (2d ed.
1999).
54. Id.
55. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 645.
56. See Richard Marston, Gregory S. Hayt, and Gordon M. Bodnar, Derivatives as a Way of
Reducing Risk, in THE COMPLETE FINANCE COMPANION supra note 33 at 345, 345–52 (describing a
survey of nonfinancial U.S. businesses that found widespread use of derivatives to manage risk).
57. Huang, supra note 48, at 485–86; Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, The
Global OTC Derivatives Market at End-December 1999 (May 18, 2000), http://www.bis.org/press/
index.htm.
58. Unique risk is that portion of the risk of securities that can be diversified, and so does not pay
a higher expected return.
59. CHAMBERS & LACEY, supra note 53, at 594; Smith et al., supra note 19, at 127–28.
60. The corporate income tax rate is 15% on the first $50,000 of income, 25% on the next
$25,000, 34% on the next $9,925,000, and 35% thereafter. I.R.C. § 11 (1994).
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asymmetry. Firms with positive taxable income in any year pay taxes, but
firms with a loss do not get refunds. Instead, these firms have no tax
liability.61 Because of this asymmetry, a firm with highly volatile earnings
will have a higher expected tax liability than a firm with steady earnings.62
This creates an incentive for firms to hedge in order to reduce their taxes.
By making their income more stable, such firms can reduce their expected
taxes. Since the government takes less, more is left for shareholders.63
Second, hedging can create value by reducing the costs of financial
distress and bankruptcy. The managers and shareholders of a firm in
financial distress have incentives to make decisions that do not maximize
the value of the enterprise. For example, they have the incentive not to
contribute capital to undertake new investments if a portion of that capital
might be siphoned off by debtholders. They also have the incentive to
pursue risky projects that have a negative NPV because their downside is
truncated by limited liability. In addition, managers will demand higher
compensation for the risk that they will be blamed for a failure that was
beyond their control. The possibility of reducing these agency costs by
making the firm’s earnings more stable is another way in which financial
engineering can create value.64
61. The tax system also contains a complicated provision for carrying losses back two years and
forward twenty years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2000). However, because these losses do not carry
interest, a loss carried forward is less valuable than an immediate refund. Thus, the carry-over
provision does not eliminate the asymmetry, but merely reduces it. Since the asymmetry remains, the
effect persists.
62. In effect, the government’s tax claim is similar to a call option on a portion (equal to the tax
rate) of the firm’s income, and the call option is worth more the more volatile is the underlying asset
(here, the firm’s income).
63. CHAMBERS & LACEY, supra note 53, at 594; Smith et al., supra note 19, at 129–32. But see
Krawiec, supra note 19, at 1077–78 (observing that tax-based explanations of hedging do not apply to
most large U.S. corporations that hedge); Roberta Romano, Derivative Securities Regulation, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 590, 596 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(same).
64. CHAMBERS & LACEY, supra note 53, at 594; Smith et al., supra note 19, at 132-34, 136-37.
Knoll has taught the Smith, Smithson & Wilford article since he began teaching corporate finance
almost ten years ago. That article explains how the M&M Theorem can be turned upside down and
used to explain how derivatives can create value for corporations. In his experience, the article works
well both to illustrate what we have been calling the Reverse M&M Theorem and to illustrate how that
theorem can be used to understand how publicly traded corporations use derivatives to create value.

2000]

CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCE THEORY

187

D. TRACKING STOCK
Last April, AT&T raised $10.6 billion when it issued tracking stock in
its wireless operations.65 Tracking stock does not represent an interest in
the entire company, but only in one part of the company.
Tracking stock first appeared in the mid-80s when General Motors
(GM) issued tracking stock in its Electronic Data Systems (EDS) and
Hughes Electronics subsidiaries. By July 1999, fifteen other companies
had issued 37 tracking stocks with most of these offerings occurring since
1996. Besides GM and AT&T, other recent high-profile issues (and their
parent companies) include Go.Com (Disney), CarMax (Circuit City), Sprint
PCS (Sprint), and ZDNet (Ziff-Davis).66 Other companies that are
considering issuing tracking stock include Cendant, Dow Jones, DuPont,
JC Penny, Microsoft, NBC, the New York Times, and Staples.67
The issuance of tracking stock is obviously a capital structure
decision. It is also a new phenomenon upon which scholarly attention is
only now being focused.68 The Reverse M&M Theorem tells us that if
tracking stock creates value for the issuing firm’s shareholders, that value
must come through the failure to meet one or more of the M&M
assumptions.
Underwriters sometimes speak of firms issuing tracking stock in order
to unlock value buried in the corporate issuer.69 In order to make sense of
65. Suzanne McGee, Deals & Deal Makers: AT&T Wireless Sets IPO at $29.50 a Share As
Traders Brace for Largest U.S. Debut, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2000, at C21 (reporting that AT&T raised
$10.6 billion from the sale of its tracking stock).
66. Susan Scherreik, Tread Carefully When You Buy Tracking Stocks, BUS. WK., Mar. 6, 2000,
at 182.
67. Id.; Robert McGough, Tracking Stocks Fail to Justify Their Buzz, a Study Finds, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 25, 2000, at C1.
68. Several finance studies document positive excess returns for firms announcing the issuance
of tracking stocks. See, e.g., Matthew T. Billet & David C. Mauer, Diversification and the Value of
Internal Capital Markets: The Case of Tracking Stock, J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2000); Julia
D’Souza & John Jacob, Why Firms Issue Targeted Stock, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 459 (2000); Dennis E.
Logue, James K. Seward & James P. Walsh, Rearranging Residual Claims: A Case for Targeted Stock,
FIN. MGMT., Spring 1996, at 43. But a recent study finds significantly negative excess returns from
buying and holding tracking stocks for a three-year period following their issuance. Matthew T. Billet
& Anand M. Vijh, Long-Term Returns from Tracking Stocks (May, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=229549.
69. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Shares That Track Assets Add Value at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1999, § 3 (Money and Business), at 7; Adam Lashingsky, Will The Boom in Tracking Stocks Derail
Investors?, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 210; Arthur M. Louis, Tracking Stock Can Unleash a Unit’s
Value, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 1999, at C1; Making Tracks, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, at 79; Steven
Syre & Charles Stein, Genzyme Tracking Stocks Are Off Track on Returns, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24,
1999, at D1; Maria Vickers, Are Two Stocks Better Than One?, BUS. WK., June 28, 1999, at 98;
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this suggestion, consider a conglomerate with two or more lines of
business. Assume further that it is difficult for investors to value the
underlying businesses. In such a case, there might be a substantial
difference in opinion among investors on the value of each business. In
that case, some investors who place very high values on one or more of the
firm’s parts might not hold its common stock if they place a sufficiently
low value on the other parts such that they value the whole package below
its market price. Tracking stock, thus, has the potential to increase the
firm’s market value when investors hold heterogeneous expectations
because it allows those investors who place the highest value on each unit
to invest only in that unit. In effect, tracking stock allows the issuer to
unbundle the business for the purpose of selling its parts without having to
separate the operations.
Another situation which lends itself to the use of tracking stock
involves a firm that has different investment projects available, only some
of which are difficult for investors to value.70 Investors are likely to
discount the hard-to-value projects significantly because of the problems
caused by asymmetric information. If the firm needs to raise new capital to
finance these projects, but cannot issue debt, it will have to issue equity at a
discount. This discount will come at the expense of existing equityholders.
If, however, the firm can issue tracking stock in the units that are easier for
investors to value, then any discount will be smaller or perhaps nonexistent.
Thus, it might be cheaper for the firm to raise capital by issuing tracking
stock in a transparent unit than to issue equity in the whole firm, which is
more opaque.
A third possible explanation for tracking stock is that it is a currency
that can be used to provide management with stock-based incentives that
are tied to specific units.71 Such stock is said to align more closely
managers’ and shareholders’ interests because most managers have a
bigger impact on their division than they do on their firm as a whole. Thus,
tracking stocks might create value by reducing agency costs.72
Deborah Adamson, The Truth About Tracking Stocks, CBS MARKETWATCH (Jan. 5, 2000), at
http://cbs.marketwatch.com/archive/20000105/news/current/clueless.htx?source=&dist=.
70. These projects might simply be difficult for investors to value or the firm might have
proprietary information that it cannot release to investors without also releasing it to its competitors.
71. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 574–
76 (1992) (describing GM’s issuance of tracking stock as motivated in part by a desire to maintain
employee incentives within EDS); J. FRED WESTON, KWANG S. CHUNG & JUAN A. SIU, TAKEOVERS,
RESTRUCTURING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 254–55 (2d ed. 1998) (same).
72. For tracking stock to create value, its benefits must outweigh its costs. The Reverse M&M
Theorem implies that capital structures can destroy value as well as create value. Firms can throw away
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E. CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND BUSINESS LAW
Corporate, securities, bankruptcy, and commercial law all regulate
dealings among investors. By prescribing various rights, these laws
partition investors’ interests in firms.
Accordingly, if the M&M
assumptions were accurate, none of these laws would have any effect on
firm value.73 However, because the M&M assumptions are not accurate,
the laws regulating investor relations can affect the firm values through
taxes, and information and agency costs.
Consider corporate law, which in the United States is state law.
Although each state has its own corporate law, more than half of the
Fortune 500 and more than forty percent of the companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware.74 If the law had
no effect on value, it would be surprising to find so many firms
incorporated in such a small state where many of them had no other
operations. Although commentators have debated whether Delaware law
increases or decreases total value,75 the Reverse M&M Theorem tells us
where to look.
If complete contracts could be written and enforced at no cost, there
would be no agency costs from potential conflicts between investors. It is
because such contracts are impossible that agency costs occur. To protect
themselves from later being exploited, those who do not exercise control
pay less for their securities; and those in control take advantage of their
value by paying excessive legal, accounting, and investment banking fees and by paying for otherwise
unnecessary shareholder proxies to amend corporate charters. See Russ Banham, Track Stars, J. ACCT.,
July 1999, at 45, 48. Moreover, tracking stock imposes agency costs by creating conflicts of interest
over cost allocations, liquidation rights and internal transfer payments. Jeffrey J. Hass, Directorial
Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need for a Duty of Fairness, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2089, 2091–93 (1996) (arguing that such conflicts arise when managers have disproportionate
interest in different divisions and proposing a new duty of fairness to deal with such conflicts).
73. If investors could not contract around these rules, security prices would adjust to reflect the
value of the rights they conveyed, but the aggregate value of the firm would remain unchanged.
74. Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Delaware’s Preeminence by Design, Foreword to
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, AT F-1 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999).
75. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that state competition for corporate charters constitutes a race to the
bottom), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that such competition constitutes a race to the top).
See also Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy created by judicial predominance permits
Delaware to retain its preeminent position).
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position. The net effect is a reduction in value.76 To the extent that
corporate law can efficiently restrain such actions, it reduces waste and
increases value. Normatively, then, the law should try to minimize total
agency costs (and other costs that result from the deviations from the
M&M assumptions). That is complicated because restrictions that reduce
waste also restrict the flexibility to make valuable investments. It is further
complicated by the need to take into account the efficiency of private
contracting solutions.
Consider U.S. federal securities laws. If a particular asset is deemed
to be a security, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates
it. The SEC also regulates options on securities and security indices.77 The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over all
futures contracts, commodities and options on futures contracts. The SEC
regulates options on foreign currencies traded on a U.S. national securities
exchange, while the CFTC regulates them otherwise. Derivatives that are
not traded on an exchange, known as Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives,
are not regulated by the SEC or CFTC, but are governed by standard
contract law.78 This messy jurisdictional hodge-podge, whereby financially
equivalent instruments are governed by different or no regulatory agencies
depending on legal classifications, is the result of numerous political battles
and compromises. It means that corporations can engage in regulatory
arbitrage by issuing legally distinct, but financially equivalent
instruments.79
If the M&M assumptions were correct, regulatory arbitrage is both
valueless and harmless. The Reverse M&M Theorem, thus, can help us to
understand such arbitrage. For example, by opting out of U.S. securities
laws, a corporation can avoid the cost of mandatory disclosure
requirements. If markets were efficient and perfect, such actions would
increase firm values. Conversely, to the extent that securities markets are
inefficient and imperfect, a firm might increase its value by complying with
76. For example, managers exploit shareholders to the detriment of both through excessive
expenditures on perks that the managers value at less than their cost.
77. EDWARD F. GREENE, ALAN L. BELLER, GEORGE M. COHEN, MANLEY O. HUDSON, JR. &
EDWARD J. ROSEN, 2 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES
MARKETS §13.04[3][c] (4th ed. 1998).
78. OTC derivatives may also be governed by federal anti-fraud provisions, state common law
(including not only contract law, but also tort law for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of
fiduciary duty), and potentially state statutory law, including anti-gambling statutes.
79. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L.
211, 231–35 (1997) (discussing how regulatory arbitrage can achieve different accounting treatments,
avoid investment restrictions, and qualify for government subsidies).
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a regime of mandatory disclosure with strict penalties.80 Such disclosure
could increase value by mitigating moral hazard and associated agency
costs.81
The Reverse M&M Theorem also suggests how to evaluate the tax
law’s treatment of capital structure, such as its relative treatments of debt
and equity. If the other M&M assumptions were true, the tax advantage
provided by debt would have no social welfare cost. Firms would use more
debt, but this would simply be equivalent to a reduction in corporate taxes.
It is because the other assumptions are not true that the tax-advantaged
treatment of debt has real economic costs. Because bankruptcy and
financial distress costs are positive,82 the tax-favored treatment of debt
encourages more debt, increasing these costs.83 Moreover, because not all
activities and assets have the same financial distress costs, some activities
can support more debt than others.84 Accordingly, the tax system misallocates investment by encouraging investment in projects that can be
heavily debt-financed and discouraging it in projects that cannot.85
IV. CONCLUSION
If the M&M assumptions were accurate, capital structure would have
no effect on firm value. If that were true, chief financial officers,
investment bankers, and corporate lawyers would have all but disappeared,
taking with them corporate finance as an area of scholarship and teaching.
But the assumptions are not accurate, work is booming, and the discipline
is flourishing. All this is possible because capital structure can create value
by reducing taxes, by providing information, and by lowering agency costs.
A lawyer who understands how capital structure can create value is better
able to advise her clients on how to structure their transactions to take
80. See EDWARD B. ROCK, SECURITIES REGULATION AS LOBSTER TRAP: A CREDIBLE
COMMITMENT THEORY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE (Inst. for Law and Econ., Univ. of Penn. Law
Sch., Working Paper No. 269, 1999).
81. As is often quoted, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman.” LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (Torchbook ed. 1967) (1914).
82. See Edward Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39
J. FIN. 1067, 1076–83 (1984) (estimating the total costs of financial distress as 12.1% of corporate value
five years prior to filing for bankruptcy and 16.7% at the time of filing).
83. Roger Gordon & Burton Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in HOW TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 131, 172 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (estimating the welfare loss
from encouraging debt over equity was $3.2 billion in 1975).
84. According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, low-volatility, low-growth firms that
use few intangible assets can support more debt than high-volatility, high-growth firms that make
extensive use of intangible assets. Myers, supra note 41, at 170.
85. Knoll, supra note 19, at 1491–97.
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maximum advantage of those opportunities without violating the law.86
Such a lawyer is also better able to evaluate the law and suggest beneficial
reforms.

86. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) (developing a planning approach for understanding what business
lawyers do); Miller & Sharfman, supra note 7, at 305 (answering question of whether it is important for
law students to study corporate finance emphatically in the affirmative).

